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COMPLEX TIMES DON'T CALL FOR COMPLEX
CRIMES*
RICHARD E. MYERS II*
This Essay argues that the rise of the administrative state has led to an
overabundance of criminally enforceable regulations, so many in fact
that the law has become in many ways unknowable. At the same time, a
large portion of criminal lawmaking has moved away from the
politically accountable legislature and into the "expert" agencies. The
combination of inscrutability and lack of accountability has led to a
corresponding loss in the efficacy and legitimacy of the criminal law
itself There are many old, adaptable criminal laws that already cover
the conduct that agencies criminalize by regulation. Given the costs, the
legislature should not only avoid making new delegations of criminal-
lawmaking power to agencies, it should consider contracting their
power by repeal, sunset, and jury empowerment.
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INTRODUCTION
This symposium is focused on adaptation and resiliency in legal
systems, and has been inspired by new interest in the way the law
responds to the complexities of the modern world. One significant,
longstanding legal adaptation to this complexity has been the rise of
the administrative state, with its concomitants, government
investment in expertise, and abundance-some would say
overabundance-of regulation. Regulation has exploded, in part
because Congress has ceded significant portions of the lawmaking
field to regulators with massive delegations of rulemaking authority,
and the Supreme Court has concurred, with the virtual death of the
nondelegation doctrine' and the birth of the Chevron2 regime.3 The
Court has also conceded any ability to meaningfully police the
civil/criminal distinction," leaving that determination almost entirely
to the legislature (or its deputized regulators), and has permitted
strict liability criminal regimes to proliferate.' These developments
have led to strong negative reactions from many quarters.6 This Essay
sketches some of the concerns that arise when the legislature passes
1. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REv. 327, 328
(2002) ("The Supreme Court has resoundingly rejected every nondelegation challenge
that it has considered since 1935.").
2. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. See infra Part III.
4. For an excellent discussion of the Court's brief foray into policing the
civil/criminal distinction, followed by its abandonment, see Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the
Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 679, 683 (1999) ("In the face of the
modern melding of the distinction between crimes and civil wrongs, and the Court's
realization that it cannot always sensibly distinguish a punitive from a non-punitive
sanction, it now routinely blesses whatever label a legislature places on a sanction, and
appears to have returned to an 'all-or-nothing' approach to the imposition of criminal
procedural guarantees to a proceeding."); see also United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas,
Inc., 829 F.2d 532, 544 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that a court is permitted to find a forfeiture
statute criminal rather than civil in the face of a congressional designation only where "the
clearest proof exists that the purpose or effect of the forfeiture is so punitive that it
requires [it] to override Congress' preference for a civil sanction").
5. See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LEGISLATION 11-12 (2004) (report sponsored by the Federalist Society) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
6. See, e.g., id.
1850 [Vol. 89
COMPLEX TIMES
statutes that will render as yet undefined conduct criminal, on the
basis of forthcoming regulations, especially when it gives that power
through multiple statutes to multiple agencies in overlapping fields.
When, how, and to what extent the ability to define the scope of the
social condemnation inherent in the creation of criminal law should
be granted to administrative agencies is a complex set of questions.
This Essay agrees with those scholars who argue that regulations
should principally be used for regulating behavior, as their name
suggests, not meting out condemnation and punishment.
Ultimately, this Essay adds to this symposium on adaptation a
cautionary note, urging parsimony on the part of the legislature in its
delegations of crime-defining power to executive branch agencies,
and suggesting adaptation should include an increase in systemic
checks and balances and legislative oversight of criminalization.
Congress should employ a range of tools such as sunsets, second
looks, periodic review, and mandatory reporting back to ensure that
the delegations it does make are appropriately carried out.7 This
Essay suggests that where administratively created regulations inform
older and deeper moral notions-for example, don't cheat, don't
steal, don't knowingly create physical harm, don't knowingly destroy
the value of other people's property-there are plenty of old,
resilient, well-understood crimes, albeit ones that might be committed
in new ways, that will serve as a basis for moral condemnation. The
legislature has enough time to create fully articulated new crimes
where they are truly warranted. Finally, this Essay argues for
expanding the role of the jury to more closely match the original
constitutional vision. This adaptation would reinvigorate the jury's
law-evaluating power and recommit us to using jurors to help
calibrate the law's moral compass. Steering more closely by that
compass will help us to ensure that the criminal law retains the
legitimacy that has helped the United States to build a resilient and
lasting constitutional democracy.
This Essay proceeds in seven parts. Part I lays out the process of
creating regulatory crimes. Part II discusses the potential conflict
between social condemnation and the utilitarian impulses that may
lead to criminalization. Part III discusses Chevron deference and the
limits it creates for judicial oversight. Part IV discusses the problems
that the regulatory-criminal complex creates for democratic
7. Congress sometimes does attempt to use such tools, for example through the
Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), which should be sufficiently funded to
engage in the oversight that the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of
1996 and other legislation mandate. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-612 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010).
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governance. Part V argues that crime creation should be a legislative,
not regulatory judgment. Part VI discusses forms of oversight. Part
VII discusses potential solutions to the problem.
I. THE PROCESS OF CREATING REGULATORY CRIME
To understand the shoals that the administrative state is building,
it is important to understand where these criminally enforceable
regulations come from. Congress regularly passes statutes that
delegate to an agency the power to promulgate regulations, while
providing that violations of the yet to be written regulations will be
crimes subject to statutory penalties. Examples from the
environmental arena alone can be found within the Clean Water Act,'
the Clean Air Act,9 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,'o
the Endangered Species Act of 1973,n and the Wildlife Disaster
Recovery Act of 1989.12 Similar rules could be found in many other
substantive areas, such as banking, securities, or health care.13
After Congress passes these statutes, the agency, under its
rulemaking authority, engages in notice and comment rulemaking,
which is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. 14 While
Congress has set broad goals, regulators decide what conduct will
ultimately be punishable. Many pollution-control statutes, for
example, criminalize the release of pollutants under certain
conditions. What constitutes a pollutant, what kind of permitting is
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2006).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2006).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2006).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2006).
13. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 17-31 (collecting crimes).
14. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500, 553, 557 (2006). Agencies also engage in other important but less
visible forms of rulemaking, for example through interpretive letters, enforcement
standards, or other informal mechanisms. See, e.g., SEC Interpretive Releases, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp.shtml (last visited Apr. 29, 2011) ("The
Commission occasionally provides guidance on topics of general interest to the business
and investment communities by issuing 'interpretive' releases, in which we publish our
views and interpret the federal securities laws and SEC regulations.").
15. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)
(2006); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (2006); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1268(e), (g) (2006); Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 411 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2006); Ocean
Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2006); Act to Prevent Pollution From Ships, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1908(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-2(b), 300h-
3(c), 300i-1 (2006); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4910(a)(1), 4912(c) (2006);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (e), (f) (2006);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (2006); Emergency Planning and
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required to handle that pollutant, how the pollutant may be stored,
and who within an organization may be subject to criminal
punishment are all within the regulatory agency's control.'" A second
set of regulators, the members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
("USCC"), decides how much punishment will attach to violations of
the regulations. Congress created the USCC as another
administrative agency, this one ostensibly housed in the judicial
branch, and charged it with normalizing sentences to ensure that
punishment reflects offense conduct." The USCC enacts the federal
sentencing guidelines, which are supposed to reflect the commission's
expert judgment on appropriate sentences.
What does it look like in practice? Insider trading is a textbook
example of the process of creating crimes through delegation to an
agency." In the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress delegated
the authority to regulate the stock market to the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC").20 In the enacting legislation, it
included section 78j(b), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange ... [t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.2'
In response to this delegation of authority, regulators within the
SEC issued an implementing regulation, Rule 10b-5, "Employment of
Manipulative and Deceptive Devices,"2 2 which contains the following
substantive provision:
Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(4) (2006); Hazardous
Materials Transportation Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5124 (2006).
16. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
17. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
18. See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, http://www.ussc.gov/About-theCommission/Overview-of-theUSSC/USSC
_Overview.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
19. See JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 77-81 (3d ed.
2007); ELLEN S. PODGOR & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN A NUTSHELL
71-84 (2004).
20. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006)).
21. Id.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.23
Willful violations of these regulations are punishable by up to
twenty years in prison and fines of up to $5 million per violation.24
While the statute creates a legislatively enacted range of
available punishment, in practice, that cap is only the first step in
determining how much punishment a defendant will actually face. For
the purposes of the insider trading example, the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines section 2b1.1 creates a table that calculates one
component of the harm to society caused by a financial crime based
on the amount of actual or intended loss associated with the
defendant's conduct. 25 The defendant's criminal history, the actual or
intended loss amount, and any enhancements based on the way the
crime was committed or the nature of the victims combine to create a
presumptive sentence under which the defendant's guidelines range is
calculated. 26 This produces a range of months.27 As the loss amount
increases, so does the number of months that appear within the
sentencing range. A judge then chooses within that range, unless
there are extraordinary reasons to sentence outside the calculated
guidelines range.'
In practice, then, there are two layers of regulators between the
people's elected representatives and the ultimate sentence: the
agencies defining criminal conduct and the sentencing commission
deciding how much punishment should attach. Other doctrines
23. Id.
24. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006).
25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b) (2010).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. § 1B1.1.
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prevent the people's other direct representative in the criminal justice
system, a jury, from passing on the moral content of the regulations.2 9
II. A CONFLICT OF VALUES
For some, criminalization is simply an additional way to put teeth
into behavior modification under the rule of law, and there is no
meaningful distinction between civil and criminal law. But for others,
there are significant tensions between the utilitarian impulses
underlying much of administrative law and the moral commitments
that apply to criminal law. Under the traditional view, criminal law is
supposed to reflect and channel society's moral impulses, and
criminal law necessarily contains an element of social condemnation.
As Richard Lazarus has said, "Criminal sanctions are not simply
another enforcement tool in the regulator's arsenal to promote public
policy objectives. A criminal sanction is fundamentally different in
character."30 On the other hand, the strictly utilitarian view is counter
to the American constitutional tradition, but may be more reflective
of the current state of the law than the view that the tradition
supposedly represents. Of course, any critique of the use of the
criminal law external to its reflection of democratic processes requires
a prior sense of the purpose of the criminal law, or perhaps a belief in
a constitutional commitment to other limiting principles, such as
separation of powers.
Christopher Slobogin has noted that the margin between the civil
and criminal law is eroding in part because of the concentration of
power within agencies." And agencies are not likely to seek to limit
themselves. There are institutional reasons that drive regulators to
29. See generally Richard E. Myers II, Requiring a Jury Vote of Censure to Convict, 88
N.C. L. REV. 137 (2009) (noting the limited role that juries play in criminal trials and
arguing for a change in the law that would require juries "to make a specific finding of
censure in addition to any factual finding required under the law before a defendant could
be convicted, as opposed to the current system of a general verdict finding the defendant
guilty or not guilty").
30. Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and
the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 867, 883 (1994).
31. Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV.
121, 121-22 (2005). This is a development Slobogin would embrace, and like the
utilitarians who are happy to add criminal teeth to civil sanctions, he would add civil
incapacitation to traditionally criminal conduct. In his view it is high time to require the
criminal law to take dangerousness seriously. See id.; see also Margaret V. Sachs,
Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025 passim (explaining the rise
of "hybrid" regulatory statutes that regulators can enforce through either criminal
prosecutions or civil suits).
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ask Congress to give them the authority to add criminal sanctions to
their regulatory regime, and for them to use that authority
expansively. An agency that has a criminal statute to enforce must be
taken seriously. By creating criminal offenses, agencies enhance their
status, they can seek additional enforcement resources, and their
enforcers get leverage over regulated parties. In addition, they can
retain power over investigations, have independent access to the U.S.
Attorney's offices and the Department of Justice ("DoJ"), and can
force capitulation in civil enforcement cases where they can plausibly
threaten to bring criminal charges. Once they are granted even
ambiguous authority, we should expect agencies to seek to expand
that authority to the fullest extent possible.
III. CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Once the agency begins interpreting and enforcing its statute, the
courts are extraordinarily deferential. The Chevron doctrine
established a rule of construction that requires courts to defer to
reasonable agency interpretations of the statutes the agency
administers when Congress has not spoken specifically to the issue in
question.32
While the Chevron opinion itself was undertheorized, the
resulting literature has focused on several rationales that support the
decision.3 3 One rationale is agency expertise, a second is the
nimbleness and flexibility of agency rulemaking compared to the
often cumbersome legislative process, and a third is the relative
political accountability of agencies compared to the courts.34 I will
consider the tradeoffs inherent in each justification in turn.
32. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
33. See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency
Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1289-98 (using justiciability as an
interpretive analogue); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 618-19
(1992) (arguing that Chevron is based on policy preferences); David M. Hasen, The
Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327,
357-62 (2000) (invoking the justiciability analogue); Daniel Lovejoy, Note, The
Ambiguous Basis for Chevron Deference: Multiple-Agency Statutes, 88 VA. L. REV. 879,
885-99 (2002) (exploring the prudential doctrine, presumed congressional intent rationale,
and constitutional rationale).




Perhaps the most important consideration in favor of deference
for purposes of this symposium is agency expertise within a particular
field.35 As the individuals most conversant with the tradeoffs at issue
within their sphere of expertise, regulators know better than Congress
what should be done, and through notice and comment rulemaking,
the affected parties and the agency overseeing them can hammer out
a set of rules that adequately address the underlying problem that
Congress was attempting to solve. Of course, this makes some
seemingly questionable assumptions about the severability of spheres
of life and the availability of time for the regulated parties. A business
owner may simultaneously be trying to run a business while staying
abreast of regulation issued by a virtual alphabet soup of agencies: the
EPA, OSHA, the SEC, the DEA, the IRS, the SBA, and on and on.
At the same time that the citizen is responding to multiple,
overlapping, and sometimes conflicting regulatory schemes, the
regulators from each of these agencies are convinced that their
concerns should be very important to the regulated party. As
rulemakers, the agencies may be aware of all of the regulations within
their respective domains, but that domain expertise does not put
them in a position to adequately weigh the potentially conflicting
demands that overlapping schemes may make on the regulated. In
fact, each agency may be committed to a heartfelt belief in the
centrality of the regulated field (it is after all what they spend all of
their time and energy thinking about) and operate under a certainty
that the sky will in fact fall if there are any violations within the
agency's sphere of expertise.
Moreover, expertise in a particular domain does not mean
expertise in moral judgment, which helps determine which conduct
has become egregious enough to be a crime, nor in the relative moral
judgment inherent in deciding how much to punish this defendant
compared to other defendants.
B. Enhanced Flexibility
A second justification for the Chevron regime is the enhanced
flexibility that occurs when Congress spots a problem, creates a cadre
of experts to address it, and gives them the authority to create
appropriate rules to solve the problem going forward. As Professor
35. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 739-41 (2002)
(discussing expertise rationale).
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Ruhl has suggested, many of the most intractable problems in the real
world can only be solved through the input of the many participants
in "complex adaptive systems."" In some ways, the law is struggling
to figure out a difficult core question: How do we regulate things we
don't understand? One way is to create mechanisms that have
sufficient inherent flexibility to permit new information to be
processed quickly. This flexibility rationale runs contrary to the
principle of legality, and its interpretive counterpart, the rule of
lenity, which are especially critical in the criminal sphere.
The courts have consistently held that prosecutors'
interpretations of criminal statutes are not entitled to Chevron
deference, even though the DoJ is charged with administering
criminal statutes." This resistance has been justified in part because
the nature of the expertise deployed in applying a rule is considered
different than that deployed in creating one." One way that the
courts have explained away the conflict between lenity and deference
is the notion of intended delegation." Where Congress has expressly
delegated the authority to regulate, and where the agency has issued
regulations compliant with the Administrative Procedures Act
("APA"), the courts have held that the ambiguities in the statute that
might support an underlying claim of lenity no longer exist.40 The
36. J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal
Systems - with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1374-75
(2011). See generally J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-
and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996) (explaining how law and society interact
under complexity theory).
37. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) ("[W]e have never thought
that the interpretation of those charged with prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to
deference."); see also, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 264 (2006) (recognizing that
it is the duty of the attorney general to "evaluate compliance with federal law in deciding
whether to prosecute; but this does not entitle him to Chevron deference") (emphasis
added); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 941 (2000) (citing Crandon and stating that a
state attorney general's interpretation of a law was not binding); Note, Justifying the
Chevron Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2043, 2048-49
(2010) (noting the Supreme Court's refusal to bow to DoJ interpretation).
38. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 264.
39. See generally Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting
Fundamental Values With Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1575, 1710-11 (2001) (suggesting that the Supreme Court engages in democracy-
forcing interventions in cases where it needs to "make sure that the then-sitting legislature
was being 'responsive to the people,' rather than to the clamoring of a narrow interest
group well positioned to block legislative reform") (citation omitted).
40. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
704 n.18 (1995) (refusing to apply the lenity exception where regulations issued under the




clarifying regulation has created sufficient certainty to satisfy the
requirements of legality. The principle of legality that underlies these
concerns about when and how to apply Chevron is still strong. As
Professor Griffin explains in detail in her article in this issue, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the broadest interpretation of 18 U.S.C
§ 1346, which encompassed deprivation of a right of honest services in
cases where there was no direct benefit to the accused, was
overbroad, and permitting the statute to be enforced in that way
rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague.41
The scope of permissible agency action in criminal cases is
governed by additional commitments-the constitutional bar on ex
post facto legislation and the rule of lenity. The ex post facto
limitation, which is driven by legality concerns, makes it
unconstitutional for the state to convict someone of an act that was
not a crime at the time the act was performed. This limitation would
make the adaptation and flexibility in cases such as Chenery II,42
discussed by Professor Hornstein elsewhere in this symposium, 43
unconstitutional in the criminal context.
The rule of lenity, which has deep roots in the common law of
England and in U.S. law," requires that ambiguous criminal statutes
be read in the way that most favors the defendant, limiting the
application of criminal sanctions to those cases where the legislature
clearly intended them to attach.4 5 Chevron requires that agency
interpretations be given deference by the courts, and would permit
interpretations broadening as well as narrowing criminal liability.
These rules potentially conflict, as scholars and the courts have
recognized. 46 A court might have to choose between a narrowing
interpretation of liability, as dictated by the rule of lenity, and a
41. Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 1815, 1825 (2011).
42. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201-03 (1947) (explaining that
agencies must be able to act by general rule or by individual order to respond to varying
and unforeseeable challenges).
43. Donald T. Hornstein, Resiliency, Adaptation, and the Upsides of Ex Post
Lawmaking, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1549 passim (2011).
44. See Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 748, 748-51 (1935); Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 57, 86-97 (1998).
45. See Hall, supra note 44, at 748-52.
46. See, e.g., Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR
L. REV. 1, 38-47 (2006); Solan, supra note 44, at 128-34; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2115-16 (1990). But see Dan
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 507-11
(1996) (attempting to reconcile lenity and deference).
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broader definition advanced by an agency. The conflict should result
at the very least in deep skepticism regarding the wisdom of attaching
criminal penalties to regulatory schemes. The tension between the
two almost guarantees litigation over the way agencies interpret
criminal regulations. Any reasonably sophisticated criminal defense
attorney should be able to offer plausibly narrower readings of a
criminal statute in many cases. By permitting more and more criminal
regulation, Congress is ultimately inviting such litigation, squandering
resources, and increasing red tape.
C. Relative Political Accountability
A third justification that has been advanced for the Chevron
regime is the relative political accountability of agencies versus the
judiciary.47 According to this theory, agencies must report to the
president, who is a nationally elected figure held responsible by
voters at the polls. 48 In contrast, the federal judiciary is composed of
life-tenured, politically insulated actors, who need not, and will not,
consider the concerns of the electorate. But this begs the question.
Recognizing the fact that agencies may be somewhat more
accountable politically than the courts misses the core commitments
of the Constitution to separation of powers and bicameralism which
require that multiple politically-accountable parties have to sign off
on rules governing conduct before they take effect as law. It is these
considerations that inform the next Part.
IV. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE CONCERNS
The rise of the regulatory-criminal complex also leads to
concerns about democratic governance. As we shall see, it tests our
constitutional commitment to separation of powers and checks and
balances, it leads to concerns about the ability of even a highly
engaged citizenry to engage in political oversight, and it permits
governmental actors to duck political accountability. At some point,
flexibility and adaptability begin to look like absence of
accountability and lawlessness.
A. Structural Commitment
The simplest argument against having regulators engage in
criminal lawmaking is that it violates the constitutional notions of
47. Note, supra note 37, at 2044.
48. Id. at 2043.
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bicameralism and presentment.49 While this argument has much
persuasive power, the courts have dismissed it. This constitutional
argument played itself out through the rise and fall of the
nondelegation doctrine.5 o The doctrine holds that in a system of
separated powers, one unit may not delegate the powers
constitutionally entrusted to it to another unit."' For our purposes,
that would mean that the legislature is not permitted to delegate
lawmaking power to the executive.52 The courts have avoided the
implications of the nondelegation doctrine in the regulatory-criminal
context by holding there to be no delegation and that the
implementing regulations merely carry out the orders that the
legislature put in place, so long as it has given the regulating agency
"intelligible principles" to follow. The nondelegation doctrine, if not
entirely dead, has no pulse, but the concerns underlying it still exist.54
For those concerned with perceptions of liberty as a goal of
government, the limits included in separation of powers, including
capacity limitations, have collateral benefits. A shortage of time limits
the raw amount of legislation that Congress can pass, thereby
protecting the citizenry from government overreaching. Checks and
balances in our system mean that there has to be a social consensus
before we make behavior a crime. However, the compromises and
tough choices inherent in legislation are often avoided by passing
49. Cf. Boris Bershteyn, Note, An Article I, Section 7 Perspective on Administrative
Law Remedies, 114 YALE L.J. 359, 369 (2004) (noting that the rise of the administrative
state has altered the traditional allocation of powers in federal policymaking established
by the bicameralism and presentment requirements in favor of the executive).
50. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 14 (1993) (critiquing
the delegation of lawmaking power to agencies that lack political accountability); Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1721, 1740 (2002). But see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the
Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1328
(2003); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Delegation of Lawmaking Power to the Executive
Branch, in SEPARATION OF POWERS: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 116, 127 (Katy J.
Harriger ed., 2003) (examining the pros and cons of "reviving the principle against broad
delegation").
51. See sources cited supra note 50.
52. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892).
53. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (upholding
delegation as constitutional so long as Congress provides the agency with an "intelligible
principle" to interpret the law).
54. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) ("In a
delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated
legislative power to the agency. Article I, § 1, of the Constitution vests '[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted ... in a Congress of the United States.' This text permits no
delegation of those powers." (citing Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996)))
(alterations in original).
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generic statutes that proclaim lofty goals, such as a clean environment
or protection of endangered species. By the time the hard choices are
made, the legislators are politically insulated.
B. Notice
The complex regulations that result from delegation also create
notice problems for the regulated, and for the polity writ large. Notice
and comment rulemaking provides a very different kind of notice to
the public than is provided when matters are on the congressional
agenda. As noted earlier, the idea that notice and comment
rulemaking adequately permits the regulated entities to participate in
self-government requires some important fictions. One must pretend
that the regulated entities have sufficient time, money, and capacity
to engage in any rulemaking that will affect them, and that the
constructive notice at issue really constitutes notice. Even regulations
that are beautifully detailed and contain the product of perfectly
drawn balances between our values are hard to follow if it is
impossible to keep up with them as they are issued. The hoary maxim
that ignorance of the law is no excuse is defensible when the law is
based on widely held knowledge and deep societal commitments, but
it becomes much more problematic when the criminal code contains
hundreds of crimes and the code of federal regulations contains
hundreds of thousands of regulations that may serve as the bases for
criminal prosecution.
Additionally, in a world of rational ignorance, notice and
comment rulemaking is more likely to lead to interest group capture
of the agency than it is to a broad consensus about particular
behavior." While it is possible that the system will result in
regulations that are the result of careful consideration of all of the
possible consequences, we are just as likely to have regulations that
were designed for the benefit of particular individuals who for
purposes of their own have devoted the time and energy necessary to
capturing the system.
C. Political Accountability
Another democratic governance concern is political
accountability. A system of administrative regulation and sentencing
55. The rationally ignorant voter has little time to devote to policing political actors.
Notice and comment rulemaking will be watched by stakeholders, but not by the public at
large. It is possible, of course, that advocacy groups will arise to advance the public
interest, but it is by no means necessary.
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commission determination of appropriate punishment creates two full
layers of political insulation between the legislature and the
punishment associated with a particular crime-a conduct layer and a
punishment layer-permitting the legislature to pass the buck on
accountability to the unelected regulators. Legislators can simply pass
a relatively vague, hortatory statute and then run against the
regulators when it becomes clear whose ox is being gored. They can
argue that the implementing regulations are more complex than they
intended, more punitive than they intended, cover conduct that they
did not intend to criminalize, or create costs that they did not intend.56
We have created a situation where a congressman can routinely pass
delegating law and then campaign against the resulting regulation.57
These concerns multiply when the decision about which behavior will
be newly criminalized is not made and weighed by elected legislators
but by faceless technocrats who are focused on their domain, rather
than the big picture, and will never have to stand for election. Instead,
they are protected civil servants who may long outlast whatever
president or governor is nominally in charge. Rulemaking, even
notice and comment rulemaking, cannot substitute for the broad
social consensus represented by a legislature. Expert regulators and a
tiny subset of the regulated are an insufficient substitute for
bicameralism and presentment. In many instances, an executive
branch agency makes the rule, interprets the rule, enforces the rule,
and may even render initial adjudication on the rule it has created.59
This concentration of power in the name of efficiency is the direct
antithesis of the liberty-protecting ideas behind the separation of
powers. Our current system places ever greater pressure on the
56. See William A. Niskanen, Legislative Implications of Reasserting Congressional
Authority Over Regulations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 939, 941-42 (1999).
Congress often approves very general regulatory legislation-leaving the
regulatory agencies with broad discretion to define the law by the rules they
promulgate. This permits members of Congress to play both sides of the street-to
take credit for the presumed benefits of the regulation and to blame the agencies
for the costs of meeting specific rules. The President accepts the role of regulatory




58. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 139 (2008).
59. For example, immigration laws follow this pattern, with enforcement taking place
under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security and adjudication taking place
under the Executive Office of Immigration Review, both of which are components of the
DoJ. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 1-3 (2006).
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already endangered civil/criminal distinction. Once the regulation is
deemed civil-and punitive fines can be civil, as can incarceration-
the procedural protections that criminal enforcement mandates
disappear.
V. NEWLY DETERMINED WRONGS-A LEGISLATIVE, NOT
REGULATORY CALL
At the center of my critique is a commitment to the principle that
crime is not the subject of expertise, or of elite views, but instead
should be evidence of broadly and deeply held moral commitments.?
Agencies may be experts in their spheres, but they are not the
appropriate arbiters of society's moral center. The criminal law
should reflect society's moral judgments, not the judgments of
experts.61
According to Dan Kahan, delegation is a good thing if we want a
successful regulatory state. "Delegation-whether express or implied,
whether to agencies or courts-is a strategy for maximizing Congress'
policymaking influence in the face of constraints on its power to make
60. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 5-7 (1995) (discussing the role of
community values in the formulation of criminal justice policy); Paul H. Robinson, Why
Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus
Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839,1861-63 (2000) (same). Sources discussing
the expressive function of the law include: Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The
Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological
View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 221-22 (1965) (discussing the emergence of incarceration for
economic crimes); Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 947, 949, 953, 979 (1997); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 22, 24, 37; Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 407 (1958);
Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 435-40 (1963); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence,
Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351, 362, 365 (1997); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2445-48 (1997); Kenneth Mann,
Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE
L.J. 1795, 1863 (1992); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 397-400 (1997); Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling
Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 519, 521 (1996) (focusing on the employment
consequences of the stigma associated with being convicted of a crime).
61. Other scholars agree. See Kristen E. Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG,
26 VA. TAX REV. 905, 923 (2007) ("[D]eciding that particular actions should be criminally
punishable is an act of collective moral judgment and condemnation. As designated
representatives of the people, members of Congress are both more in touch with
communal perceptions of 'right' and 'wrong' and more accountable to the public for the
moral judgments they make than agencies are.").
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law."62 Shortages of political capital and of time lead Congress to
delegate to courts the power to fill in the gaps.
In such circumstances, members of Congress are likely to avail
themselves of the "virtue[s] of vagueness," drafting statutes in
terms sufficiently general that legislators on both sides of a
disputed issue can "tell [their] constituents that [they] obtained
language to protect them" while leaving it to courts to devise an
interpretation of what "congressional intent" was.63
But this expansive use of criminal sanctions clearly comes with
costs. As another scholar has noted, "Estimates suggest that over
three hundred thousand federal regulations are punishable by
criminal penalties enforceable through the combined efforts of as
many as two hundred different federal agencies."'
According to Paul Robinson, legislators have increasingly used
the criminal law where civil regulations were once the norm, hoping
to increase deterrence by calling undesirable behavior a crime, and
enlisting the moral power of the name. This change is
counterproductive, he argues, because overuse of the label "crime" in
areas that were historically merely civil weakens the moral force of
that label everywhere.65
The weight of the commentary suggests that overcriminalization
undermines the law.' These scholars suggest that the moral authority
62. Kahan, supra note 46, at 474.
63. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting CHARLES R. WISE, THE DYNAMICS OF
LEGISLATION 178 (1991)).
64. Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting
"Apparent Innocence" in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 32 (1995). According
to Pilcher, "In contemporary America, virtually every regulatory scheme, particularly in
federal law, includes felony criminal enforcement provisions to add 'teeth' to the costs of
noncompliance, covering such diverse areas as environmental safety, securities markets,
employment practices, consumer protection, public benefits, and international trade." Id.
65. Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1995,
at 72, 77.
66. BAKER, supra note 5, at 3; Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
ALMOST EVERYTHING passim (Gene Healy ed., 2004); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEX,
DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
OVERCRIMINALIZATION 1-28 (1982); Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag
Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46
EMORY L.J. 1533, 1535-41 (1997); Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L.
REV. 755, 769 (2004); Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRiM. L. 261, 267-68 (2003); V.F. Nourse, Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and
Harshness, 39 TULSA L. REV. 925, 935-38 (2004) (arguing that overcriminalization is a
consequence of the federal system); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The
Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 638 (2005);
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505
passim (2001); Symposium, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
2011] 1865
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of the law is deeply damaged when good people know that they
cannot possibly fully comply with the law, no matter how hard they
try.67 Erik Luna has put it quite succinctly: "When the criminal
sanction is used for conduct that is widely viewed as harmless or
undeserving of the severest condemnation, the moral force of the
penal code is diminished, possibly to the point of near irrelevance
among some individuals and groups."'
At the same time that it undercuts the moral authority of the
criminal law, overcriminalization also reduces the efficacy of the law
more generally. It makes the law incomprehensible, so that it actually
reduces compliance because of despair. James Delong has noted that
there is a point of diminishing returns when the impossibility of full
compliance leads to reduced efforts to comply.
Overuse of punitive sanctions damages the moral fabric of the
culture .... [W]hen people who regard themselves as
responsible moral actors learn that they have committed
criminal offenses they have never even heard of, their first
reaction is disbelief. Their second is contempt for the law. The
developing perception is that one cannot possibly keep up with
all the rules and cannot afford to try. The rational person must
shrug and accept the possibility of criminal conviction as one of
the risks of life ... 69
As Benjamin Cardozo said, "Law as a guide to conduct is
reduced to the level of mere futility if it is unknown and
unknowable.""
Other commentators have made this point directly to Congress
during oversight hearings. Roger Marzulla, a former assistant
attorney general charged with representing numerous agencies, put it
this way: "Citizens remain subject to tens of thousands of unclear and
541, 541 (2005); Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, Am. Bar Ass'n, The
Federalization of Criminal Law, 11 FED. SENT'G REP. 194, 194-95 (1999); Paul
Rosenzweig, The Overcriminalization of Social and Economic Conduct, THE HERITAGE
FOUND. passim (Apr. 17, 2003), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf-media/2003/pdf/lm7.pdf.
67. For a version of this argument based on general concerns regarding regulatory
overcriminalization, see James V. DeLong, The New Criminal Classes: Legal Sanctions
and Business Managers, in Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra note 66, at 9, 36-37. Other
scholars have suggested that the moral authority of the law is a more important
component than the risk of punishment in ensuring compliance. See ROBINSON &
DARLEY, supra note 60, at 5-7, 201-15; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
19-68 (1990).
68. Erik Luna, Overextending the Criminal Law, in Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL, Supra
note 66, at 1, 7.
69. DeLong, supra note 67, at 9, 36-37.
70. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 3 (1924).
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inconsistently implemented and enforced regulations, with potential
exposure to millions of dollars in penalties and hundreds of years in
federal prison for unwitting violations. "71
And the distinction between civil regulations and criminal
charges is supposed to be important. Critical constitutional rights turn
on whether an action is considered civil or criminal. Moral
condemnation attaches to someone convicted of a crime in a different
way and to a different degree than it does to a tortfeasor. As
Professor Aaron Fellmeth has said, "To the discredit of the juristic
and legislative professions, the centrality of the distinction between
the civil and criminal law to our jurisprudential paradigm has done
nothing to enhance its clarity or its cogency. "72
These concerns with overcriminalization are particularly
troubling in light of recent research that helps explain why people
obey the law. Traditional explanations of compliance with the law
modeled citizens as rational agents responding to incentives and
penalties associated with abiding by and breaking the law. However,
this "deterrence" model has been subject to substantial critique in
recent years,74 in part reflecting empirical work indicating that
deterrence claims are "speculative" at best." Rather than focusing on
an individual's perception of the costs and benefits of complying with
the law, Professor Tom Tyler has demonstrated that normative
factors such as an individual's personal perception of the justice or
injustice of a particular law play a significant role in determining
whether she complies with the law.76 Tyler also identified a spillover
effect, finding that individuals who generally believe the criminal
71. Administrative Crimes and Quasi-Crimes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 85 (1998)
(statement of Roger J. Marzulla). Marzulla is particularly well-situated to make these
observations. He served as assistant attorney general in charge of the DoJ's Environment
and Natural Resources Division, and brought cases on behalf of his client agencies: EPA,
Interior Department, Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine
Fisheries Service, Department of Transportation, and Department of Commerce. See
Roger J. Marzulla, MARZULLA LAW, http://www.marzulla.com/attorneys.php?action
=view&id=1 (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
72. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
73. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1193 passim (1985).
74. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 67, at 56-57; see also Dan M. Kahan, The Secret
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 416 (1999) ("Deterrence arguments also
draw incessant fire from academic theorists."); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 458-68 (1997).
75. Kahan, supra note 74, at 416.
76. TYLER, supra note 67, at 57.
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justice system is just and legitimate are more likely to be law-
abiding." Therefore, to the extent that overcriminalization makes
good people feel that they cannot comply with the law and
undermines the underlying "moral credibility" of the law, obedience
to the law declines.
VI. ATTEMPTS AT OVERSIGHT
There has been a range of attempts at oversight by all three
branches, none of which has met with particular success. This Part
sketches judicial, congressional, and executive forays into the field.
A. Judicial Oversight
As discussed above, the judiciary has failed to enforce
nondelegation principles, and has also refused to police the
civil/criminal distinction. 79 But while the courts have been loath to
enter the fray in those areas, they have used their interpretive powers
to address concerns over complexity in other minor but symbolic
ways. Over the course of the last half century, courts have used their
interpretive powers to reintroduce ignorance of the law as a defense
to criminal prosecution in a few select cases.so This new use of
ignorance of the law as a defense has accompanied, and perhaps
responded to, a dramatic increase in the number of statutory and
administrative crimes.8 Courts have identified two particular areas-
crimes involving ostensibly innocent activity and crimes involving the
violation of highly complex regulations-where the expanding
number of crimes warrants acceptance of ignorance of the law as a
defense.82 The courts have increased access to this defense by
interpreting the statutory mens rea term "willful" in various statutes
or regulations to require that the government prove that the
defendant knew the particular statute or regulation she was alleged to
have violated."
77. Id. at 4.
78. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 74, at 498.
79. See supra Part IV.
80. See generally Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving
Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 343-46 (1998) (discussing the expanded
availability of ignorance of the law as a defense). For a recent example involving securities
laws, see Alexander P. Robbins, Comment, After Howard and Monetta: Is Ignorance of
the Law a Defense to Administrative Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of the
Federal Securities Laws?, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 299, 307-10 (2007).
81. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
82. See Davies, supra note 80, at 363-87.
83. Id. at 362-63.
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The innocent activity exception stems from the desire to ensure
that only those individuals who are morally culpable and have had
fair notice of the illegality of their conduct are punished. Lambert v.
California,' which struck down a defendant's conviction for failing to
register as a felon as required by a Los Angeles municipal ordinance,
dealt with the fair notice concern.8 ' The Lambert Court said that a
party should not be held criminally liable due to lack of knowledge of
a statute if he is "wholly passive and unaware of any wrongdoing."8 6
In Staples v. United States87 the Supreme Court said that in order to
hold a person criminally liable for illegal possession of a "firearm,"
the government must demonstrate that the defendant knew his
weapon was a firearm under the statute.' The rationale for this
holding was in part that fifty percent of American homes contain guns
and "owning a gun is usually licit and blameless conduct."" However,
the lower courts have had difficulty determining what constitutes
"innocent" activity, with some courts equating innocence with
"technical legal[ity]" and other courts equating innocence with "total
innocuousness. "90
The second exception applies in cases that involve "highly
technical statutes that threaten ... to ensnare individuals engaged in
apparently innocent conduct." 91 The exception was originally limited
to tax evasion cases such as Cheek v. United States,' but was
expanded to include other statutory and regulatory crimes following
the Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf v. United States.93 In Ratzlaf,
the Court held that the government must prove that a defendant
accused of violating federal antistructuring rules acted with
knowledge that his structuring was unlawful, rather than merely with
the purpose of circumventing bank reporting obligations. 94 However,
84. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
85. Id. at 226, 229.
86. Id. at 228.
87. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
88. Id. at 619.
89. Id. at 613-14.
90. See Pilcher, supra note 64, at 24.
91. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 185 (1998).
92. 498 U.S. 192 (1991). In Cheek, the defendant refused to pay his taxes, believing
that the income tax was unconstitutional. Id. at 194-95. The Court recognized that the tax
code is extremely complex, and found that in such cases, defendants must be aware of the
law and choose to violate it if they are to be found "willful" under the criminal tax
statutes. Id. at 199-200.
93. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
94. Id. at 136.
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the lower courts have had difficulty determining whether a statutory
or regulatory scheme is "complex" or not.95
Commentators are split on whether this expansion of ignorance
of the law as a defense is warranted. 96 Those in favor argue that the
expansion is warranted because the increasing number and
complexity of crimes increases the risk of punishing morally
blameless individuals.' This "intrusion of the criminal law into
socially unexpected realms of conduct diminishes the power of
criminal law as a social institution" because the governed will begin to
question the moral authority of the law.98 In opposing the erosion of
the rule, Professor Davies opines that the legislature, not the courts,
should define criminal conduct.9 In addition, she argues that the lack
of consistency regarding what activity is "innocent" and what
regulations are complex will generate "wide[r] uncertainty about the
law's commands."'" Taken together, these developments suggest that
the courts are aware of the complexities of the regulatory state, but
have serious-and well-founded-doubts about the legitimacy or
efficacy of judicial attempts to intervene in the agency definition of
criminal conduct.
B. Congressional Oversight
Congress has attempted to reassert its control over the federal
agencies, ironically by adding red tape to the agencies' attempts to
pass regulations. The Paperwork Reduction Actior requires agencies
to do more paperwork to ensure that the regulated do less
paperwork, or at least to justify the additional paperwork that the
agencies mandate. The Regulatory Flexibility Actl02 is designed to
ensure that agencies document the effects of rules on small
businesses. The most ambitious attempt to force regulations back
95. See Davies, supra note 80, at 372.
96. Compare id. at 348 (arguing for a "reinvigoration" of a broad bar on ignorance of
the law as a defense), with John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of
Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1161-
62 (arguing that exceptions to the rule are warranted to ensure that only morally culpable
individuals are punished).
97. For a general discussion, see Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the
Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753, 756 (2002) (explaining what he terms the "New Lenity");
see also Wiley, supra note 96, at 1022 (discussing the notion of "mandatory culpability" in
statutory construction).
98. Pilcher, supra note 64, at 34.
99. Davies, supra note 80, at 413.
100. Id.
101. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2006).
102. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2006).
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through bicameralism and presentment is the Congressional Review
Act."os The Small Business Regulatory Fairness Enforcement Act,
enacted in 19 96 11 as part of the Contract With America, created the
Congressional Review Act,"os which established an expedited
legislative process to permit Congress to review and, if it so chose, to
reverse virtually all federal agency rules via a joint resolution of
disapproval." While the existence of this mechanism shows that the
business community had sufficient clout to convince Congress to
create mechanisms that enable it to roll back some regulation, it is
less clear that Congress has the will or the attention span to actually
do so. Between 1996 and March 31, 2008, agencies submitted reports
on 731 major rules (those expected to have more than $100 million in
effect on the economy), and the GAO cataloged 47,540 nonmajor
rules." Of those, forty-seven joint resolutions of disapproval were
introduced and exactly one OSHA regulation was overturned.0 o
C. Executive Oversight
The president has the duty to oversee the federal agencies, and,
at various times, the president has issued executive orders designed to
force agencies to consider the concerns of the regulated, or of the
states.'09 Various administrations have seen the roles of the agencies
differently, and have limited agency action in different contexts for
different reasons. President Reagan, for example, committed to
rolling back some of the regulatory state in the interest of protecting
federalism.110 However, his successors in both parties have been more
agency-friendly. Regardless of the political interests a particular
103. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2006).
104. Small Business Regulatory Fairness Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110
Stat. 857 (1996) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2006)).
105. MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30116, CONGRESSIONAL
REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE 1 (2008).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 3; see also Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of
Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 102-03 (1997) (arguing that the Act's "broad
definition of 'rule' seems likely to defeat [the] goal" because of the "great volume of
regulatory actions that Congress will theoretically be called upon to consider"); Julie A.
Parks, Note, Lessons in Politics: Initial Use of the Congressional Review Act, 55 ADMIN. L.
REV. 187, 203 (2003) (noting the risk of the involvement of special interests).
108. ROSENBERG, supra note 105, at 6.
109. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601, at 77-80 (Supp. 1112009).
110. See Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in
Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483, 496-98 (1988) (explaining
Reagan's use of executive orders to rein in agency action).
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president might have in exercising executive power to meet the
interests of constituents, it is hardly surprising that presidents seek to
maintain or expand executive branch prerogatives. We can therefore
expect presidents to seek to retain the power to regulate, whether or
not they exercise it.
VII. AN INTRACTABLE PROBLEM?
Professor William Stuntz has noted that the politics of criminal
law are pathological, and that it is virtually impossible to repeal
criminal laws once they are in place."' Nonetheless, for the reasons
detailed above, we should be committed to shrinking, not expanding
the criminal code. If we were, we would institutionalize rolling back
old crimes,112 weed out regulations regularly, and apply cost-benefit
analysis to much of the machinery of the regulatory state. Congress
and the president have tried to do so, by Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB") oversight,'13 by reporting requirements,'1 4 and by
executive order."' But none of these attempts seem to be working.
This does not mean that we should give up. There are some solutions
we might consider.
A. Stop
The simplest solution would be simply to use the existing
political processes to get the legislature to stop creating new
regulatory crimes. Instead of passing thousands of new regulations,
we should rely instead on old, well-understood statutes that map our
moral intuitions. There is considerable resiliency of the moral norms
that underlie the criminal law. Old moral precepts easily adapt to new
information. If something is newly discovered to be harmful to human
beings, for example, there are old moral notions and old crimes that
govern the moral component of the behavior. It has long been
111. See Stuntz, supra note 66, at 556-57 (explaining that politicians are rewarded for
enacting crimes in times of crisis, but receive no such benefits from repeal).
112. For one possible way to roll back crimes on a mandated schedule, see Richard E.
Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law Through a Criminal
Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1356 (2008) (arguing for the passage of a
constitutional amendment that would provide time limits for all criminal laws, resulting in
mandatory sunset).
113. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. See generally Nicholas Bagley &
Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1260 (2006) (describing attempts to create regulatory watchdogs outside the agencies).
114. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), revoked by Exec. Order 12,866,
3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601, at 77-80 (Supp. III 2009).
115. See, e.g., id.
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immoral and illegal to knowingly hurt another member of one's
society. The crimes of murder, assault, or battery, depending on local
definition, already cover the wrong.
Can this be right? If the behavior is truly new, then it cannot
already have been outlawed, can it? Clearly new problems call for
new crimes. So the flexibility and resiliency that I suggest exists in
these old laws should run into legality problems, shouldn't it? Not so.
The underlying harms are old, they are simply being committed in
new ways. In fact, if we want more coverage on new ways of
committing old crimes, we should rely on the broadly stated crimes,
and rely on a combination of harm focus and mens rea to ensure that
the crimes do in fact cover immoral conduct. Otherwise, the "bad
man" will rely on the specific crimes to engage in "loopholing."ns
To the extent that the civil regulations matter to the criminal law,
it is because they demonstrate notice regarding the harmfulness of
behavior. Because the transmission of new knowledge requires time,
civil enforcement and regulation will allow the general public to
understand the way that new conduct maps onto old harms. Mens rea
requirements ensure that the social condemnation associated with a
criminal conviction reaches only those who deserve it.117 The time
between the discovery of new information and the transmission of
that information at a sufficiently wide level for a new moral consensus
to form is uncertain, but there is no question that moral notions and
beliefs about harm change over time."' Requiring the prosecution to
prove mens rea, even at the level of negligence, permits the jury to
serve as a test bed for the dissemination of the necessary information
about harm. If a reasonable person would know that the practice was
116. See Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is An Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous,
96 MICH. L. REv. 127, 138 (1997). This is what Professor Kahan has called the "prudence
of obfuscation." Id.
Moral judgments are too rich and particular to be subdued by any set of abstract
rules; as a result, law will always embody morality only imperfectly .... The more
readily individuals can discover the law's content, the more readily they'll be able
to discern, and exploit, the gaps between what's immoral and what's illegal.
Id. at 129.
117. There are some who support strict liability regimes, at least for public welfare
offenses. But their support often rests on a legal fiction: that strict liability is acceptable,
especially in regulated areas, because such statutes affect the public welfare, the penalties
are low, and the regulated parties have plenty of opportunity to learn the regulations that
affect them. As we have seen above, as notions of the public welfare have exploded, and
regulation has multiplied, a participant in a regulated market might have to know
thousands of regulations and be responsible to dozens of regulators.
118. This change over time in moral beliefs is referred to by Professors Ball and
Friedman as "intergenerational drift." See Ball & Friedman, supra note 60, at 221.
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harmful, or if this particular defendant was on notice that the practice
was harmful, then knowledge had spread far enough to serve as a
proxy for social condemnation of the practice.
But there is no evidence that we intend to stop. As Professor
Stuntz said, "[C]riminal law expands in different areas at different
times and places, but it always expands."119
B. Sunset
If we are not willing to stop, we might proceed, but with greater
caution. There are a number of possible mechanisms that would
permit a precommitment to caution. Congress could insert sunset
provisions into enabling legislation, and has done so in some
contexts.120 In other work, I have suggested amending the
Constitution to insert a provision that would have all criminal laws
sunset after twenty-five years, guaranteeing that crimes passed in
haste could be reassessed at leisure. 12 1 This approach would also short
circuit the political problems that arise when observers conflate a vote
to repeal a statute with condoning the underlying conduct. Because it
would guarantee work in the future, but only if the statute was
criminal, we could also expect regulators to be more parsimonious
with criminal laws, leading them to prefer civil regulations.
C. The Jury
If we will not constitutionally precommit to limiting the criminal
code, lack the resources or political will to clean up the existing code,
and cannot count on the courts to police these problems except in the
most cursory way and in the narrowest possible class of cases, is there
another mechanism we could employ? In addition to a front-end
check on the legislature, I also propose a reinvigorated jury as a vital
check on runaway regulation.
The criminal jury is both adaptable and resilient. In some ways,
the story of the jury has been one of increasing egalitarianism. Jury
service was once limited to the same elite class that served in the
legislature, white male landholders. Over a series of constitutional
119. Stuntz, supra note 66, at 527-28.
120. See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74. U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 255-59
(2007) (providing examples of "temporary" or sunset legislation by both federal and state
legislatures). Gersen cites among his many examples: the legislation creating the
independent counsel who investigated President Clinton, certain tax cuts, portions of the
USA PATRIOT Act, bankruptcy rules, immigration rules, and energy policy. Id. at 255-
59, 277.
121. Myers, supra note 112, at 1329, 1362.
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decisions, the Supreme Court expanded jury service to include
women1 22 and racial minorities,'m and guaranteed the right to jury
trials for all felonies punishable by more than one year, in state or
federal courts. 24
At the same time that the right to serve and the right to a jury
trial were expanding, the powers of the jury were shrinking. Between
the framing and the present, judges have stripped much of the jury's
original power, undermining its critical check and balance
functions. 125 Judges ruled that jurors could not be informed of the
punishment that the defendant was facing,126 and that they were to be
instructed that they had to follow the law as the judge read it to
them,'127 and that attorneys could not ask the jury to acquit because
the application of an otherwise just law was unjust in this particular
case.128  The jury is commanded not to perform independent
research.129 Jurors are generally not allowed to ask questions,'30 and in
many cases, even extremely complex regulatory cases, are not allowed
to take notes. 13 In some cases, judges have decided to strike for cause
jurors who are aware of their power to nullify.132 All of these
122. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 523, 525 (1975) (holding a statute that
required women to affirmatively register for jury service unconstitutional).
123. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (holding
unconstitutional a statute limiting jury service to whites).
124. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968).
125. See CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE
passim (1998).
126. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (stating that unless the jury
is involved in sentencing, it should not be informed of the potential sentence). For a now-
dated but insightful discussion of the issue, see generally Robert Bartels, Punishment and
the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Modest Proposal, 66 IOWA L. REV. 899 (1981).
127. See CONRAD, supra note 125, at 117-24.
128. Cf. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993) ("A trial judge,
therefore, may block defense attorneys' attempts to serenade a jury with the siren song of
nullification.").
129. See, e.g., SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.02 (2009)
("Remember that you must make your decision based only on the evidence that you saw
and heard here in court. Do not try to gather any information about the case on your own
while you are deliberating.").
130. See, e.g., Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: "To Ask or Not
To Ask, That Is the Question," 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1099, 1099-1100 (2003) (discussing
the varying court practices and finding that while technically barred in a only a subset of
jurisdictions, jury questions are generally discouraged).
131. See Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the Adversarial Ideal,
21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 85, 89 (2002).
132. See Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and
Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 435 (1998) ("Venirepersons who admit
during voir dire that they were exposed to nullification advocacy or who express doubts
about or disagreement with the criminal law or its enforcement are being excluded from
jury service with challenges for cause.").
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developments have stripped the jury of its intended constitutional
functions.133
By reversing this trend, either by judicial ruling or by legislation,
we could restore the jury to its role as "the very palladium of free
government," the "bulwark of liberty" that it was intended to be."" A
fully informed jury-one that has read the statute and the regulation
rather than jury instructions drafted by attorneys-can act as a check
on the complexity of the regulation and, most importantly, can ensure
that the regulation that is violated actually has stated a sufficient
moral judgment to demand the social condemnation that comes with
a criminal conviction.'
Juries are also available in theory more than in practice. At the
same time that the administrative state has been growing, the relative
number of trials has been shrinking. In their stead we have seen the
rise of the administrative justice system, where the vast majority of
cases are processed via plea bargain.'36 And the tools that might make
that plea bargain system more successful-talented and well-trained
lawyers on both sides of the case with sufficient time to weigh the
issues, examine the facts, and reach a well-thought-out negotiated
compromise-are shrinking. Prosecution offices and particularly
public defenders are underfunded, to the point that we have a system
of "justice for some."'
D. More Lawyers
Whether we proceed by trial or by plea bargain, it takes well-
trained lawyers to navigate a system as complex as ours. Critics
suggest that, in theory, the American justice system offers great
133. See Myers, supra note 29, at 155-58.
134. See Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Ascent of the National Palladium: The Resurgent
Importance of Trial by Jury and the Coming Revolution in Pennsylvania Sentencing, 13
WIDENER L.J. 11, 22-36 (2003).
135. See Myers, supra note 29, at 156-57 ("The jury enshrined in the Constitution is the
jury that acquitted John Peter Zenger of seditious libel, one that had the power to
determine the law as well as facts."); see also Pilcher, supra note 64, at 6 (arguing that
defendants should be able to argue "apparent innocence" to the jury in a "narrow class of
cases," forcing prosecutors and legislators to ensure that such cases reflect local moral
norms).
136. See Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral
Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1067, 1080 (2004) ("As a collective, defense attorneys-as well as trial judges and
prosecutors-are generally unaware of the existence and scope of collateral consequences.
This lack of knowledge stems largely from the fact that these consequences are scattered
throughout federal and state statutes as well as numerous regulations.").
137. See id. at 1090.
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opportunities to have one's case developed and tried, but only for
those wealthy enough to afford it.'38 And almost no one is wealthy
enough to afford it.'39 Public defenders are woefully underfunded."
As the law becomes increasingly complex, even well-trained, well-
meaning lawyers cannot fully understand all of the implications of a
criminal conviction.141 The collateral consequences in many cases-
offender registry laws, civil disabilities, loss of benefits, and
deportation-are potentially more onerous than the punishment that
attaches to the initial criminal conviction.42 To combat this increasing
complexity, we need more well-trained lawyers, on both sides of the
case. We need prosecutors with the time, training, and motivation to
carefully sort cases before they get to court, so that the innocent are
protected, and uniformity in prosecution is assured. And we need
compliance counsel and defense attorneys with the time and
resources to investigate and understand the increasingly complex
regulatory criminal regime, so that they can keep their clients from
crossing very murky lines in the first instance, and defend them
appropriately when they are accused of having done so.
CONCLUSION
So I end this brief Essay where I began, with an exhortation to
parsimony and a call for checks and balances. A system that is too
complex for citizens to know and understand is not a system that
actually governs. If people cannot know the law they cannot follow it.
Dispersing the crime-creation function to dozens of regulatory
agencies with their own disparate agendas makes it unlikely that
anyone is paying meaningful attention to the volume of law, or the
ways in which different fields interact. If the volume of law is
overwhelming, if the law has become unknowable, we can have
beautifully crafted law that has no effect in the world. Such a system
lacks moral authority and accountability.
A simpler criminal code, one in which far fewer and more
flexible crimes are deployed, one that tracks old and well-understood
138. See Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics
Perspective, EMORY L.J. 1169, 1169 (2003) (noting that under-funded public defenders
"carry grossly excessive caseloads and are therefore severely restricted in how much time
they can devote to individual clients").
139. Id.
140. See Pinard, supra note 136, at 1090.
141. See id. at 1080.
142. See Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 253 (2002) ("[C]ollateral
consequences may be the most significant penalties resulting from a criminal conviction.").
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harms, makes far more sense. Our old moral intuitions are very
flexible, because they recognize that we can find new ways to lie,
cheat, steal, and hurt people.'43 There is a natural impulse to name the
new way of doing harm. It seems to fit our notions of legality to
suggest that we should say that a particular way of committing the
harm is banned.'" But we can use civil regulation to inform people of
the myriad ways in which harms are committed, and count on mens
rea to ensure that we prosecute only those actors who have had fair
notice. Complex times do not call for complex crimes. They do call
for a commitment to doing the right thing.
If we are truly committed to limited and democratic government,
we need political accountability and checks and balances. Our current
system seems to have cascaded out of control, and needs
institutionalized brakes on the front end and the back end. If the
legislature cannot expend the time and energy required to make the
moral judgments and to engage in the political balancing inherent in
creating crimes, it should be barred from farming out that
responsibility.145 Multiple institutional actors must be required to take
a thoughtful second look at the application of law to fact. Prosecutors
should be fully funded so they can exercise independent judgment,
defense counsel should be fully funded so that they can adequately
investigate and defend the accused, and judges should have the power
to render sentences that fully account for the defendant's true
culpability. Mandating some intergenerational humility in the form of
a criminal sunset amendment would also force parsimony in the use
of the criminal sanction. Finally, we can and should empower the
people's representatives in the criminal justice system, jurors fairly
chosen from a cross-section of the community, to use deep intuitions
about notice, fairness, and justice to decide in particular cases
whether we have struck the right balance.
143. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 41, at 1829 (explaining that "[flraud is about gaining
advantage through deception" and corruption "takes creative forms and occurs in
relationships structured to avoid detection," so the offenses must be flexible "to keep pace
with evolving forms of misconduct to protect an important but imprecise set of interests");
cf. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 8-11 (2007) (highlighting empirical work
suggesting that intuitions of blameworthiness and justice are widely shared).
144. There may also be some magical thinking, that by naming and banning the specific
type of thing that we fear, we increase the odds of banishing it.
145. Whether this be by renewed judicial attention to the nondelegation doctrine, by
constitutional amendment, or by legislative precommitment is beyond the scope of this
Essay.
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